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1. Introduction  
When this paper will be published the new EU enlargement will have been accomplished. 
From May 1st 2004, ten Central and Eastern European and two Mediterranean countries will 
officially enter the Union. These countries are the three Baltic Republics (Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania), Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, the Slovakian Republic, Slovenia and the 
two Mediterranean islands of Malta and Cyprus.  
These countries will be entitled to take part to the next Intergovernmental Conference that 
may adopt the new Union Treaty (an actual Constitution based on the European Convention); 
they will also participate to the European elections for the renewal of the European 
Parliament, which will be held right after the enlargement, in June 2004.  
The text of the closing statement of the Copenhagen European Council says that "this 
result proves European people's common determination to merge into a single Union that has 
become the driving force for the achievement of peace, democracy, stability and prosperity in 
our Continent".  
This powerful and crucial statement crosses out past tensions, latent conflicts, difficult 
dialogue between two areas of the same continent: the Western area, a market context 
dominated by the Atlantic influence, and the Eastern area, intent on experimenting with a form 
of society that was based on the concepts of real communism. At the geopolitical level, the 
transition from a form of co-operation that is focused on mainly mercantilist principles to a 
configuration that is driven mainly by the progressive accentuation of a tangible political 
integration represents an extraordinary opportunity for the new European Union to play a 
much more incisive role on the global scenario during the years to come. 
At the same time, in explicitly pragmatic terms, one cannot underestimate the fact that 
such a broad area has a primary influence on internal market transformations, on European 
labour market division, on the new opportunities that will arise from a growing international 
competitiveness. In order to understand the extent and the perspectives of the process 
triggered by the new enlargement, and to reflect over the challenge that the new Parliament 
and Commission will have to face, a brief account of geopolitical and geoeconomic evolution 
of the Union is appropriate.  
The original integration process was conceived in order to favour economic aspects 
mainly, although the contrasts between East and West during the 50s were so tense that the 
entire Eastern front was openly exposed to the danger of Soviet penetration, which threatened 
especially the UK and USA. 
An emphasis on internal European relationship in terms of regional economies in such a 
context may have seemed absurd without considering the actual awareness of an 'impossible' 
overcoming of that fence, the Berlin Wall, which would restrain any 'political' enlargement of 
continental Europe.  
After all, the post-war race for welfare urged to concentrate all efforts on the economic 
'reconstruction' of Europe, focusing all Community partners' attention on some significant 
interventions both by ECSC (European Coal and Steel Community), and EURATOM; the 
former aimed at revaluating troubled industrial areas that were involved in conversion 
processes of steel activities, and the latter dealt with cooperation in the field of nuclear 
research for peaceful aims. Inevitably, with the Treaty of Rome, the first six European partners 
tackled the problem of supporting underdeveloped regional economies: the main goal was 
bringing Italian Mezzogiorno and Southwestern French territories closer to more dynamic and 
active regions such as Lorraine, Île de France, Dutch Randstad and north-western Italian 
industrial triangle (Compagna, 1973). 
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The origin of European integration can be interpreted as an urge for economic 
convergence, so much so that the policy of progressive extension itself ends up being the 
explicit motivation for the need of extending the 'market' dimensions, and it overshadows that 
political integration which had been roused by liberal progressive intellectual wings 
(D’Aponte, 1983). Nevertheless, a closer look to the enlargement processes of the sphere of 
influences and of the consequences brought about by the countries of the new European Union 
unveils certain dynamics which tend to a progressive balance of the new Community subject 
in geopolitical terms. This reassessment of the overall structure is certainly favoured by the 
most recent perspective which will be discussed in this paper: the unexpected disruption of the 
insurmountable Eastern border that the Iron Curtain had made 'impossible' at the beginning of 
the constitution of the Treaty of Rome. 
As a consequence of the new political world geography, today we can reflect about the 
relationship that links geopolitics and geoeconomy, both on a global scale and in the European 
enlargement process. Such observations should start from the fact that over the past fifty years 
profound transformations in the international economic order have caused: 
1) a progressive trend towards economic systems’ interdependency; 
2) a clear polarization of development problems and of economic growth processes in 
terms of strong dichotomy between the North and South, and the East and West of the world. 
In other words, while the integration between rich countries' economies has evolved along 
a model that has determined a notable welfare increase (both in cumulative terms and in  terms 
of social distributive effects), the gap between these and less developed or less resourceful 
countries has increased, causing serious economic, political and social consequences.  
However, due to a number of predictable reasons, such a persistent unbalance between 
different geographic and political regions on the planet has caused tensions and violence that 
reverse on richer countries and affect the international economic order. Needless to say, a 
complicated tangle of circumstances explain the contrast between high GDP concentration 
areas and areas with a weak Product accumulation. 
In order to understand that, we can simply observe the relationship between consumer 
countries and countries that produce energy goods, and between technology exporting and 
importing countries, in terms of comparison between per capita income distribution and 
individual consumption. This would highlight that an overall rebalance of development social 
effects is necessary in order to prevent the risk of sudden changes in the international order. 
Recent crucial political transformations that have followed the fall of the 'wall' in eastern 
European countries and the consequent opening of such countries to market economy, 
represent extraordinary geopolitical circumstances that have immediate direct effects at the 
economic and social level, and they outline more advances in integration scenarios which – as 
in the case of European Union enlargement – have a significant political value.  
Notwithstanding, we ought to acknowledge that the consequences of profound 
transformations in international relationships occurring in contemporary world reflect on a 
general reorganization of international labour division; hence, the whole of the above 
mentioned geopolitical events correspond to a significant geoeconomic readjustment on a 
global scale. Nevertheless, while new political situations and different geopolitical orders take 
shape in Europe and among more industrialized countries (OECD area), hotbeds of war and 
religious, social and economic tensions have had upsetting effects on the international order. 
At this level, major concerns come from the tensions that have been growing during over 
forty years of unwise international policy with Arabic countries and the complex Middle-
Eastern sector. Here, due to the lack of a solution to age-old territorial contrasts, a state of 
permanent conflict has caused the loss of tens of thousands of lives and the emergence of 
dangerous widespread terrorist manifestations.  
Generally, also with reference to the sad crumbling of the Yugoslavian federal state, the 
most critical areas confirm the need for a general reassessment of North-South and East-West 
relationships, independently from traditional logics of mere commercial incidence based on 
the control of base product resources. 
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Tab. n. 1. External fronts transformation due to the enlargement of the comunity 
 
MILLIONS OF INHABITANTS  MAIN FRONT 
Year % of.2004 pop. Surface(kmq) NORTHERN EASTERN SOUTHERN WESTERN 
1958 189 Mill. in. -%43 1.276.500     
 France 2004=100 W. Germany W.Germany Italy France 
 Germany 1958 = 43 Holland Italy   
 Italy      
 Belgium Density=148,1     
 Holland      
 Luxemburg      
1973 273 Mill. in. -% 62 1.634.000 Denmark W. Germany Italy France 
 Ireland 2004=100 Ireland Italy  Ireland 
 United Kingdom 1973=62 United Kingdom  Un. Kingdom 
 Denmark      
  Density =167,1     
1981 288 Mill. in  -%65 1.766.000 Denmark W. Germany Italy France 
 Greece 2004=100 Ireland Italy Greece Ireland 
  1981=65 United Kingdom  Un. Kingdom 
  Density=163,1     
    W. G Italy France 
1986 338 Mill. in  -%76 2.363.000 Denmark Italy Greece Ireland 
 Spain 2004=100 Ireland  Spain Un. Kingdom 
 Portugal 1986=76 United Kingdom  Portugal 
  Density =143,0     
1995 368 M.ab.  -%83 3.234.000 Sweden Germany Italy France 
 Sweden   Austria Greece Ireland 
 Austria 2004=100  Finland Spain Un. Kingdom 
 Finland 1995=83    Portugal 
  Density = 113,8  Italy 
2004 443 Mill. in.=100 3.762.000 Sweden Lithuania Greece France 
 Hungary   Latvia Spain Ireland 
 Malta Pop. 2004 =100 Estonia Malta Un. Kingdom 
 Lithuania   Poland Cyprus Portugal 
 Latvia Density 2004  Slovakia   
 Estonia 117,8 = 100  Hungary   
 Cyprus   Finland   
 Czech Rep.      
 Poland      
 Slovenia      
 Slovakia      
 
This perspective shows that each enlargement phase of European borders expresses 
different geopolitical configurations which are intensely influenced by the evolution of East-
West relationships according to the prevailing crisis on the different fronts of the continent. 
As a matter of fact, considering the course of enlargement phases and connecting the 
different extensions that each phase has reached with the consequent geopolitical 
configuration, we get a picture that shows a progressive reconstitution of the spheres of 
influence following the consolidation of marginal geographical fronts. 
 418
In the 50s, during the constitutive phase of the Treaty of Rome, the whole Community area 
formed an extremely exposed front from all sides. The area featured also an evident tension on 
the Eastern front where the political border corresponded to an ideological border, between 
capitalism and real communism. Over those years, the problem of the Mediterranean front was 
considered through an essentially endogenous perspective, because Italy is one of Atlantic 
Alliance's biggest concernes due to Italian strong Sovietic-phile party. As a consequence, 
despite a significant number of evident issues on the middle-eastern border, hit by serious 
economic problems and a severe political instability, Europe would pay little attention to the 
Southern border. From this point of view, the front that concerned more the Atlantic Alliance 
is precisely Italy, although major attention could be paid to the Northeastern sector in terms of 
strategy. 
From this point of view, the new frontier of European integration policy moves from the 
eastern European side to the Mediterranean area, which poses several problems in terms of 
regional development in spite of member states' past efforts for a realignment of the 
economies. On the Atlantic front, despite the traditional economic and technological 
dependency of Europe on United States will hardly decrease, despite the significant 
competition increase in the productive system that is concentrated in European 'strong' areas, 
the different views that form the economic and financial policies of dollar and euro-influence 
areas determine a very unbalanced order of the commercial interchange that favours American 
economy, which has recently broadened its supremacy in many productive sectors thanks to a 
reduction of the dollar/euro exchange rate. 
2. The geopolitical approach 
Facing a scenario that features such a strong uncertainty and the need of a total 
overcoming of any unbalance that restrains a peaceful coexistence, it seems appropriate to 
develop an argument that originates from a geographical analysis of regional set-ups which 
cause the differences of the organizational models that govern the economic development of 
EU area countries. 
The aim of such an approach is to put forward observations on contemporary scenarios 
with a particular attention to both the organization of single regional set-ups in the context of 
general economic theory, and single macroeconomic aggregates, which can be identified 
according to the role they play in the organization of the main sectors of the productive 
structure. 
The thread that runs through such observation rests on the following consideration: the 
policy for the protection of the Atlantic unity is the most significant joining factor for national 
interests and political cohesion. Around this factor, for over a century Europe has developed 
privileged cultural and economic relationships with the most industrialized western countries. 
Naturally, such a set-up ended up with the search for an internal cohesion that aimed at 
strengthening the Atlantic option of the Community rather than pushing it towards policies 
focused on exogenous crisis factors. 
Basically, these strategic lines were suggested again and again over about twenty years 
through periods of intense or latent crisis without major transformations, so much so that the 
hypothesis of the UK entry raised the opportunity of a significant Atlantic consolidation of the 
Community. 
The enlargement of the first half of the 70s and that of the 80s are the events that modified 
substantially the geography of centre-periphery opposition: wider regions of the continent and 
the UK were included in the European core, as well as the marginal areas on the 
Mediterranean front (from the Iberian Peninsula to Southern Italy and Greece) and a western 
ring formed by Ireland and UK's northern and western territories. 
Actually, the UK entry into the Community definitively placed Europe within the western 
sector, so the weakness of an internal boundary, as the fictitious one that separated the two 
Germanies, seemed a rather trivial issue. At the same time, the Anglo-American opposition 
against the danger of a strong German state gradually eased back. Therefore, the Paris-Berlin 
axis took on a considerable incisiveness on the international scenario. Nevertheless, the 
approach of Paris-Berlin initiatives focused mainly on economic aspects and headed towards 
the leadership of a long massive post-industrial transition. 
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This context highlighted how regional differences are intolerable. In spite of its 
fundamental inspiration based on free competition and the rejection of any form of 
protectionism, the Community was forced to introduce assistance initiatives for the less 
developed regions; so, in mid-70s, the Community formally gave birth to its own Regional 
Policy through the institution of specific financial endowment. 
In conceptual terms, the legitimisation of the regional intervention was justified by the 
territorial projections of a development that was led by free market forces: regional 
interventions became a key standard for such forces in the interregional orientation of mobile 
capital towards unprivileged regions, which would have attracted the capital through specific 
conditions arranged according to financial and fiscal promotion interventions. 
At the same time, as a consequence of centre-periphery and development polarization 
theories, the analysis of territorial projections of capital interregional mobility highlighted a 
particular attention for the geographic bonds of periphericity. The result was that non-
secondary resources were conveyed towards infrastructure investments, also on behalf of EIB, 
in order to favour the relational nature of unprivileged areas through their integration in a 
wider extra-regional circuit. 
In the first phase that preceded the launch of the regional policy, between 1958 and 1975, 
the European Investment Bank was assigned the task of promoting the development of 
peripheral regions. In those years the EIB issued more loans to national governments (65% of 
the total) for infrastructure interventions than to productive activities to start up new business. 
Moreover, many authors pinpoint that the EIB's activity has favoured the demand mainly, thus 
the market, and it did not address such demand towards the launch of regional development 
projects that would combine infrastructure interventions with productive activities initiatives 
in the same developing peripheries. 
On several occasions we focused on specific geoeconomic aspects of this important 
process, which is characterised by an explicit orientation towards the 'convergence' of 
European economies. The purpose of this work is highlighting that the consolidation of the 
Community's Atlantic projection, favoured by the entry of UK and Ireland, reassembles the 
Western front of the European sector on one hand, while it enhances the economism 
perspective of the Union on the other hand; this trend is also characterised by a greater 
exposure to United States, to which the UK is the closest and most consistent European 
partner. 
Ultimately, the key factor in the Atlantic consolidation of Europe's geopolitical community 
set-up is an economic policy trend that is even more bound to American development and not 
considerate of the political perspectives, especially on the Mediterranean front. 
With the following entry of Spain and Portugal in 1986 the process of the Mediterranean 
front enlargement was accomplished. Greece had entered the community at the beginning of 
the 80s after the end of the Greek authoritarian regime over the 70s. The Southern quadrant 
was still extremely weak and exposed, as the Mediterranean scenario, despite many would not 
acknowledge it, was the most politically tense and economically complex area of the 
contemporary world. 
The first phase of the Euromediterranean policy proved a weak tool for the realignment of 
the economies that were more directly involved into the entry of new Mediterranean partners. 
Especially for Italy that policy turned out into aids for agriculture and incentives for the 
integrated development of rural areas, as well as some interventions in training and planning 
for the promotion of international commercial relationships. Only in the 90s, with Barcelona 
European Conference, Europe got to support a number of initiatives that would favour the 
cooperation with Southern Mediterranean countries. Actually, Europe seemed to open to wide-
ranging geopolitical issues paying more attention to contemporary dynamics on that front. 
After all one cannot underestimate the circumstances that over those years will lead to the fall 
of the 'wall' in 1989: the ancient tension on the Eastern front was rapidly easing back and 
further set-ups in the geopolitical scenario were outlining on the Eastern front. 
The first half of the 90s produced a further progress in the European integration process: 
the entry of Austria, Sweden and Finland. With the exception of Norway, traditionally hostile 
to the new political-economic situation of the continent, the Northern front was steadily 
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integrated in the Community; at this point also the rest of the Northern side, the Baltic 
countries, were increasing their interest in the European Community. 
As a matter of fact, the negotiations for the entry of ten more countries in the Union came 
to an end quite briefly. Talks were driven by the common desire of accomplishing the 
complete enlargement of the community on the Eastern front, a wide transition geographical 
area that had long threatened the European Western-phile attitude that was born with the 
Treaty of Rome. Indeed, on the geopolitical level this is a great perspective; but due to a 
number of reasons the huge differences in structures and socio-economic conditions that 
separate the new members from the rest of the Union could increase the unbalance that is 
already affecting the EU on the geoeconomic level. 
3. The myth of convergence 
After the experimentation of more and more definite and structured formulas of 
intervention to favour peripheral areas, followed by the enlargement of the 70s, from mid 80s 
on the regional policy gets a deeper involvement of less developed regions giving birth to a 
second phase. This phase, which has recently come to an end, has seen the affirmation of the 
primacy of an explicit EEC Regional Policy that was firmly grounded in the constitution of a 
European Regional Development Fund; the ERDF was endowed of resources transferred from 
the Community that were worth about 10% of total community budget. 
The most interesting characteristic, on the plane of territorial projections, was represented 
by the emphasis placed on the role of coordination and targeting of intervention plans which 
regional authorities had been called to manage. Another key factor was the principle of 
intervention additionality, which would favour a greater concentration of public in problem-
regions expenditure in order to amplify the community intervention effects on the territory and 
drive national governments to a more considerate and efficient planning of internal resources. 
Many criticisms have been expressed by the doctrine also on these criteria, and in 
particular on the scarcely constructive role played by regional bureaucratic machineries, as 
well as on the actual value of community resources compared to those allocated by the 
national state. Anyway, it needs to be stressed that, even in the case of ERFD, the most 
conspicuous intervention was the accomplishment of the co-financing of infrastructure works 
(more than 80% of the Fund expenditure undertaking) aimed at crossing out the geographic 
bonds of periphericity. 
Under many perspectives, the third phase, characterised by 1988 reform for structural 
Funds, has been considered more appropriate for an intervention of regional policy with an 
explicit geographic value. 
The reasons that justify this evaluation are a consequence of the characteristics of the new 
intervention model, which is grounded on 5 targets that feature a common criterion of 
geographic and financial concentration of available resources. 
With the adoption of these criteria a solution is given to one of the main defects of 
community intervention: the sectionalization of aids, which is caused by a strong conditioning 
of the expenditure in favour of agriculture activities, with an evident advantage for the richest 
countries of the Community. Instead, the 'regionalization' of resources allows not only a 
greater transparency in the characterization of pursued goals, but it also highlights the actual 
effects of the intervention, which appear from the growing levels of regional competitiveness. 
The principle of geographic concentration works essentially in the sphere of less developed 
regions (goal 1); the definition of such regions is determined by a per capita GDP that is at 
least 25% lower than community average. The principle is realised in operational programmes 
that co-finance different kinds of programmes: from infrastructures to the promotion of the 
productive development of goods and services. 
However, despite the growing employment of community budget for regional policy 
interventions, and despite the long experience which has lead to major transformations 
introduced by 1989 reform, without any doubt the centre-periphery distance between 
community regions has been hardly reduced and in some cases it has been increased. 
Indeed, the most complex issue, among those that limit the full accomplishment of 
community integration, is the one which concerns community regions economic convergence. 
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The concept of economic convergence can be translated into the emphasis of 'spatial' terms 
of the development policy that aims at accomplishing in European regions: 
a) spread conditions of socio-economic homogeneity; 
and above all: 
b) equal opportunities for all regions in structural terms, which means positive conditions 
for the development of productive activities where adequate environmental conditions can 
favour territorial diffusion and economic survival of such activities, and promote the 
germination of business initiatives. 
After all, the belief that discussing of wage differentials in terms of qualitative evaluation 
is neither convenient or useful, is proven by the fact that at the beginning of the 90s the gap 
between the 10 more advantaged regions and the 10 less advantaged ones was around 1:3. 
This figure expressed a rate that could not be possibly brought back to the unitary value (if we 
consider a gap of 25 points and an average growth rate of 3% per year of central regions, the 
peripheral areas should develop by 6% in order to reabsorb the differential over 10 years).  
Otherwise, the real problem is of a qualitative nature, as the accomplishment of regional 
GDP growing levels implies a process that needs the promotion of endogenous resources and 
services for a self-centred development; on top of this, it is necessary to establish an 
integration and cooperation link between companies that belong to strong territorial fields 
which can interface with companies in weak territorial fields through forms of productive 
cooperation, innovation experiences and the disposition to managing the challenge of market 
globalisation.  
Under this perspective, the economic convergence should be the ultimate goal to be 
achieved in terms of opportunities rather than through results of an 'unlikely' statistic 
equalization of regional development indicators. 
Evidently, such a position favours a 'geographic' interpretation of economic regionalism 
rather than an interpretation that follows a sort of parametric evaluation of the configuration of 
each community regional economy. 
From this point of view, some central problems need to be tackled in order to rebuild the 
territorial projections of a development process that is favoured by adequate instruments of 
regional policy; such issues must necessarily concern the evolutionary scrutiny of the factors 
that affect at least two main factors: 
a) human resources; 
b) productive system competitiveness. 
If the economic delay is considerable in most of the community periphery, the situation is 
different for one of the most important factors of the regional development potential: 
manpower resource. 
While indicators such as GDP and income outline a peripheral sector formed by weak 
European areas that is separated from the core of European regional development, 
employment rates and variation trend of manpower have varying features, even within the 
regional geography of community peripheries. 
With reference to the process that have taken place between 1985 and 1990 as a direct 
consequence of a generalized and profound restructuring of European productive system 
carried out during the first half of the 80s, we can observe two scenarios: 
a) EEC regions (central and peripheral), where the reconversion of the apparatus produced 
more favourable work conditions; 
b) Southern and central regions, as well as Liguria, Aquitaine, and most of Greek and 
Cantabrian territory, where a weak reconversion and a widespread stagnation of investments 
provoked a deterioration of employment dynamics. 
The most interesting thing here is that the most favourable scenario is the one that involves 
the largest part of Europe, about 83% of the total community population, which has enjoyed a 
gradual and significant decrease in unemployment. 
The second scenario, the one that involves Italy more than any European partner, has a 
growing unemployment rate even on the basis of very sensitive variation rates (Campania, 
Basilicata, Calabria, Sicily). 
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So, Italian Mezzogiorno's negative dynamics of the 80s was extremely serious for a 
number of reasons, despite a limited increase in employment that went against Italian general 
trend in early 80s, especially in the industrial sector. 
First of all, this negative dynamics proved a further exclusion of Southern productive 
system from the modernization process that was taking place in the rest of the country. 
Moreover, such an employment dynamics was in contrast with the demographic trend and 
with European half-term trend of work force variation. 
This trend was the manifestation of a geographic model of demographic set-up that was 
characterised by the well-known progressive birth rate decrease that had started in early 70s in 
many community regions. 
As an effect of this process, in the first decade of the second millennium community 
population will certainly reach the same levels of the previous decade. Later, the demographic 
decline will reach a rate that will vary between 1-1.2% per year, so much so that Europe will 
necessarily turn to manpower from outside the EU and orient immigration policies in order to 
face the new Eastern EU countries front and the irresistible attraction that EU will exert on the 
Mediterranean and Asiatic quadrants. 
On the level of the regionalization of these processes, the most significant differentiations 
are the ones that oppose the territories that form the core of European economic development 
to more marginal peripheries.  
As a matter of fact, the general demographic decline has been curbed by the input of 
human resources from such regions as Southern Italy, Spain, Portugal, Ireland and some areas 
of France. 
If we tackle this issue from a different perspective that considers human resources as the 
focus of a system that leads towards the increase of production and development, we highlight 
that in over 60% of European population manpower will have a first phase of stagnation and it 
will later decrease consistently.  
On the other hand, the most considerable increases are the ones that should take place in 
peripheral community territories, where the demographic base hardly forms 15% of total 
European population. 
Therefore, if the most 'fertile' population represents less that 1/8 of the total, a considerable 
increase in population is not likely to take place; this is due to the fact that low birthrate 
demographic models, which give negative natural balances, will soon reach the regions that 
still perform a good demographic behaviour in terms of fecundity. 
This observation concerns also Southern peripheral regions, which will curb the positive 
natural balance in one generation and then they will experience a demographic decline. 
The point is that the Marxian conceptual scheme of relative overpopulation, which is 
currently characterising Southern Italy, with an excessive load of population that exceeds 
global productive resources of the area, will not persist for long, at least according to the 
predictable demographic evolutionary dynamics. 
However, the transition is not simple or short: complex phenomena as the progressive 
feminilization, the increase of retirement age, the qualitative transformation of employment 
components, and the extra-EU migration pressure will complicate community labour market 
and its regionalization. 
The economic convergence will not be only a problem of peripheral areas, but if we think 
in terms of availability of local human resources, the economic convergence will be a problem 
of the strongest areas if new elements will not intervene. 
In other words, the standardization of development criteria in community regions should 
be carried out through a decrease in higher levels, i.e. a considerable halt in more developed 
regions that would allow peripheral regions to progress. 
This would not be affected by the smaller demand of manpower from the European core 
that will be triggered by the process of capital-labour substitution. 
Another issue that needs to be tackled is that of productive system potential. In this 
respect, many authors have paid special attention to the issue of regional development in terms 
of inclination to the realization of adequate conditions for global scale 'competitiveness'. 
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The level of reliability of an economic system in the long term is strictly linked to its 
ability to adjusting its own potential of knowledge, and realizing its inclination to innovation 
through adequate investments. This can favour the launch of new products and the 
rationalization of production cycles (in levels of quality and in terms of productivity), so that 
the system will be adequately competitive towards a more aggressive international 
competitiveness. 
On the regional scale, this is translated into specific investments for research and 
development of any level of work force. This should be based on a entrepreneurial context that 
is dominated by an explicit culture grounded on the importance of individual professional 
skills in the evolution of the system. 
If the culture of innovation is the product of generalised scientific progress and of a 
speculative and progressive mentality, the increase of knowledge is certainly the result of 
adequate investments. 
In Europe a little is spent on R&D (the highest levels have been reached in Germany, 
France and UK, which form 2/3 of the entire European expenditure), while in Southern Italy 
virtually nothing is invested in research (in Italy, 70% is concentrated in North-West, 25% in 
North-East and Centre; only 5% in the South); the terrible consequence of such a geographic 
structure is that some extraordinary potentialities of isolated prestigious technology research 
centres in the South do not reach the necessary criticality for the production of diffused effects 
on the territory. 
Therefore, one of the structural causes of regional inequalities of income and employment 
is strictly connected to the reduced competitiveness of the productive system that does not 
produce work opportunities and that is not open to innovation. Such a configuration has very 
few chances to produce development, while on the other hand the backwardness itself is 
paradoxically the cause of a reduced unemployment. 
In short, this argument is claiming that the issue of the economic efficiency of a region 
pivots around the continuous development of innovative models in productive processes (in 
order to favour productivity increases), and in the research for new products (in order to 
proportion them to the demand), but also for the achievement of extra segments which can 
produce acquisitions of greater market quotas (internal and external), in order to get a positive 
evolution of regional domestic product. 
The terms and the effects of the future further enlargement of EU on this process cannot be 
easily predicted; however, some observations in the field of macroeconomics seem 
appropriate. 
4. Possible transformations in the geoeconomic scenario 
In the light of the discussion developed above, the condition of unbalance that results from 
the three structural factors mentioned above (demographic models, quality of human resources 
and competitiveness of regional productive system) seem rather unlikely to be transformed. 
Hence, in order to achieve an adequate development on a community scale of both central and 
peripheral regions, some very specific interventions will have to be accomplished. But due to 
this, the repositioning that is going to take place will necessarily affect the geoeconomic 
dynamics that upset the scenario of future community development. 
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Tab. n. 2. Fundamental data of demographic dynamics and of work force in the ten countries 
of the enlargement 
2002 
Natural 
population 
increase per 
1000 
Age classes 
15-24 
Age classes
25-49 
Work 
Force 
Unemploym
ent rate 
Employed in 
agriculture 
Employed 
in industry 
Employed 
in services 
Cyprus 4,0 - - 1,5 3,9 9,6* 23,3* 67,1* 
Estonia -3,9 - - 60,5 9,5 6,9 31,2 62,0 
Hungary -3,5 14,1 35,9 51,7 5,6 6,2 34,1 59,7 
Latvia -5,3 14,8 35,1 58,8 12,6 18,8* 26,3* 55,0* 
Lithuania -3,2 14,6 36,0 61,7 13,6 22,0* 26,5* 51,5* 
Malta 2,0 14,9 34,9 48,3 7,4 1,8* 27,9* 70,3* 
Poland 0,1 16,9 36,5 57,4 19,8 19,3 28,6 52,0 
Slovakia -0,1 16,8 34,9 59,9 18,7 6,4 33,8 59,8 
Slovenia -0,6 14,2 36,8 51,3 6,1 9,5 38,2 52,3 
Source: EUROSTAT, (Statisticians for Europa, Yearbook 2003) 
 
First of all, we need to pay much attention to the incontrovertible circumstance of a 
development model that will lack work force in the productive system located in more 
developed regions, because there will not be real chances to recover from an unbalance caused 
by internal demographic factors. 
Second of all, such a situation becomes even more significant with reference to the new 
entities that are about to join the Union and their human resources. The new work force has a 
considerable technological qualification that is ready to enter a more advanced restructuring 
plan due to internal bonds on the level of productive systems modernization and to a more 
favourable social distribution of wealth. The situation outlined by the analysis of the possible 
contribution of new human and technological resources brought about by the enlargement of 
the Eastern border of the EU highlights that the achievement of the economic convergence 
may be pushed further away. 
 
Tab. 2. Structure of work force in the ten countries of the enlargement 
COUNTRY WOMEN MEN <25 YEARS >25 YEARS (2000) 
Cyprus 5,1 4,0 10,6 3,4 
Czech Rep. 9,9 6,1 18,1 5,3 
Estonia 10,0 10,2 22,9 9,1 
Hungary 5,5 6,0 13,1 6,7 
Latvia 10,7 10,3 17,6 12,2 
Lithuania 13,3 12,1 27,2 12,0 
Malta 10,5 6,5 18,0 4,7 
Poland 20,0 18,6 41,1 8,8 
Slovakia 17,4 16,8 32,9 10,1 
Slovenia 7,1 6,1 15,9 6,1 
Source: EUROSTAT, (Statisticians for Europe, Yearbook 2003). 
 
In addition to this, wider unbalances than the current regional differences are likely to be 
achieved; these unbalances tend to move the barycentre of European regional policy from 
South to East with unpredictable negative effects that will arrest a course that is still paved 
with obstacles, which is still far from the goal even in the current 15-state structure. 
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With reference to year 2000, the comparison between the ten more developed areas of the 
EU-15 and the ten more underdeveloped areas highlights extremely wide distances, as we can 
easily observe in the following table. 
 
Tab. 3. GDP differential between EU more developed and less developed regions 
(15 Countries, 2000) 
MORE DEVELOPED (EU=100) MORE DEVELOPED (EU=100) 
Inner London (UK) 241 Ipeiros (EL) 47 
Bruxelles-Capitale (B) 218 Réunion (F) 50 
Luxembourg (L) 195 Dytiki Ellada (EL) 51 
Hamburg (D) 182 Açores (P) 52 
Île de France (F) 158 Extremadura (E) 53 
Wien (A) 157 Guyane (F) 54 
Oberbayern (D) 154 Centro (P) 54 
Darmstadt (D) 149 Alentejo (P) 54 
Stockholm (S) 147 Anatoliki Makedonia, Thraki (EL) 55 
Uusimaa (FIN) 143 Norte (P) 56 
Source: EUROSTAT, Statisticians for Europe, Yearbook 2003 
 
The most underdeveloped regions are located in the South of the Union and in particular in 
France overseas territories, Portugal, Greece and Spain, while Italian Mezzogiorno, even if it 
does not appear in this chart, features a number of regions that are well below the European 
average. 
 
Tab. 4. More developed regions in the countries of the enlargement (GDP referred to EU 
average EU=100 in 2000) 
MORE DEVELOPED LESS DEVELOPED 
Praha (CZ) 121 Mazowieckie (PL) 59 
Bratislavský (SK) 98 Nyugat-Dunántúl (HU) 57 
Cyprus 76 Jihozápad(CZ) 52 
Közép-Magyarország (HU) 76 Közép-Dunantul(HU) 50 
Slovenia 67 Jihovýchod (CZ) 49 
Source: EUROSTAT, Statisticians for Europe, Yearbook, 2003. 
 
If we take into account the economic structure of the countries of the enlargement and we 
calculate their GDP in proportion to the community average, inevitably the result is that, with 
the exception of two regions in the Northeastern quadrant, the rest of the territories of the new 
European partners is in severe economic delay.   
Nevertheless, if we consider the GDP increase rate over the last years in the largest part of 
the countries of the enlargement, we could claim that in their case the course of economic 
convergence could be shorter than it was for underdeveloped areas of EU-15. Certainly, if the 
trade that appears in the table will stay as it is, even after the inclusion of local economies in 
the European system, the process of economic convergence with respect to the area of 2004 
enlargement would be rather fast, also due to the contemporaneous slowdown of Euroland. 
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Tab. n. 5. GDP yearly growth rate in the countries of the enlargement in percentage of the year 
before 
Countries 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Cyprus 6,5 1,9 2,3 4,8 4,7 5 4 2 2 
Czech 
Rep. n.d. n.d. n.d n.d. n.d. 3,3 3,1 2 2,2 
Estonia 4,3 3,9 9,8 4,6 -0,6 7,3 6,5 6 4,4 
Hungary 1,5 1,3 4,6 4,9 4,2 5,2 3,8 3,5 2 
Latvia -1,6 3,7 8 4,8 2,8 6,8 7,9 6,1 6 
Lithuania 6,2 4,7 7 7,3 -1,8 4 6,5 6,8 6,6 
Malta n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 4,1 6,4 -1,2 1,7 0,7 
Poland 2,7 6 6,8 4,8 4,1 4 1 1,4 3,3 
Slovakia 5,8 6,1 4,6 4,2 1,5 2 3,8 4,4 3,8 
Slovenia 4,1 3,8 4,4 3,7 5,9 4,1 2,9 2,9 2,1 
Source: Statistical Yearbook on candidate and southeast European countries, 2002. 
 
Nevertheless, we can maintain that if on one hand the integration process will bring about 
considerable immediate advantages to new partners that will contribute to support the growth 
of internal GDP, a number of upsetting events will be produced by the local social system; this 
will be due to an integration that will underline the enormous differences in terms of wages 
and wealth distribution among the population of EU and of the enlargement countries. 
 
Tab. n. 6. Monthly and hourly average pay and international trade with EU (% of total trade) 
Country 
Monthly 
average 
pay 
(euro) 
Import. 
from eu 
2000 
Import.
from eu 
2001 
Export.
to eu 
2000 
Export.
to eu
 2001 
Main trade partners 
(importations) 
Main trade 
partners 
(exportations) 
Cyprus 1.306 61,9 55,5 50,7 49 UK – Italy UK-Germany 
Czech.Rep 322 63,3 61,8 63 68,9 Germany-Slovakia Germany-Slovakia 
Estonia  262 60,1 56,5 55,1 69,4 Finland–Russian Fed. Finland–Sweden 
Hungary 282 64,1 57,8 72,9 74,3 Germany–Austria Germany-Austria 
Latvia 201 55,2 52,6 56,7 61,2 Germany-Russian Fed.  Germany-UK 
Lithuania 222 47,2 44 38 47,8 Germany-Russian Fed. Russian Fed. Germany 
Malta - 69,3 63,6 52 41,3 Italy – France France-USA 
Poland 335 65,9 61,4 68,3 69,2 Germany – Italy Germany - Italy 
Slovakia 253 50,1 49,8 55,8 59,9 Germany – Italy Germany - Czech Rep. 
Slovenia 850 69,4 67,7 65,5 62,2 Germany – Italy Germany - Italy 
Source: Statistical Yearbook on candidate and southeast European countries, 2002. 
 
Moreover, while the covering of the inter-export trade between the Fifteen and the Ten is 
currently rather significant, the main problem is the inevitable acceleration that internal prices 
will experience due to the integration; also, new negative consequences on the growth rate of 
internal production will be provoked by an increasing mobility of active population, or at least 
of that portion of more qualified work force that will be certainly attracted by more convenient 
wages offered by EU more developed regions. 
Anyway, a widespread European integration will provoke a widespread lack of skilled 
labour in most of the regions that form the core of community development; these regions will 
be the target of more qualified professionals, competing with the productive system of those 
countries that run for the same economic convergence. More disadvantaged regional situations 
will have to come into terms with a mix of economic and environmental incentives that 
stronger areas will exploit in order to grant the best labour offer on the international market. 
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Internationalisation, or at least a full Europeanization, of the labour market transforms the 
concept of migrations and it transforms it in a more modern concept of mobility of 
employment factors. 
Geographic sciences observe this process and explain how the relative effects become a 
considerable drive towards a profound revision of development territorialization logics, which 
end up being oriented by innovative localising factors that are extremely different from the 
ones that had regulated development territorialization in a recent past. The resulting kind of 
regional geography is redesigned both by emerging advantages and territorial opportunities for 
the allocation of productive activities, and by a different distribution of work force, which is 
definitively disengaged from the places of origin. 
Therefore, the problem of the unequal distribution of human resources comes back. During 
the most accelerated period of post-war economic boom, the efforts in addressing the erection 
of new productive plants in overpopulated areas had proven that people mobility was much 
more feasible than enterprise mobility. Of course, this does not mean that industry exportation 
towards the new Eastern countries will not continue the trend that has been de-localising 
productive cycles and some activity branches to Eastern Europe, with excellent results for 
foreign investors. Nevertheless, through the process of economic and social convergence that 
will involve the countries of the enlargement, the original localising advantages will be 
considerably reduced due to the diffusion of new values that originate from the standardization 
of inter-European economic models. 
The economic geography of a 'larger' Europe will have to consider the different structure 
of the industrial enterprise and the problems of dimensioning that will not help the localization 
of business-related activities. 
Moreover, facing advantageous conditions that are amplified by the competitiveness of 
good quality employment, workers are not emigrants anymore, but they enjoy a professional 
mobility; also, they are not exposed any longer to the kinds of contrasts and hardships that 
poorly qualified work force had experienced in the past. 
Due to all these reasons, the decentralisation of small and medium-sized enterprises (the 
core of regional development) will not be either easy or automatic despite the convenience of 
a wider supply of human resources. There are actual conditionings that follow the strong 
personification that takes place in small enterprises, as place of origin and social life, which 
characterise the expectations and the habits of an entrepreneur. These extra-economic ties, 
which concern the sphere of family and social relationships, should not be underestimated 
when a plan is conceived for a wide re-territorialization of productive settlements.   
Nevertheless, on one hand it is difficult to conceive a rearrangement of the economic 
geography of the new European productive system that would feature considerable physical 
fluxes moving on the territory; but on the other hand, a more realistic hypothesis is the 
movement of financial and commercial fluxes, mainly oriented towards the East, where the 
cheaper cost of labour will grant more localizing advantages for a longer period than in the 
South, where wage and social integration has been long accomplished. 
As far as the development in Southern Italian regions, we should address the discussion on 
the effects of the new EU enlargement towards the search of an option for the creation of 
enterprises in Italian Mezzogiorno. The necessary intervention should be innovative and it 
should focus on new kinds of enterprise rather than on strategies of enterprise movements and 
decentralised productive units’ enlargement. Such a regional policy planning should aim at 
realizing a 'network' of relationships between differently developed regions and reducing the 
technological and organizational gap between centre and periphery, in order to promote an 
'endogenous' development of Southern regions. 
As Cappellin maintains (also Kevin Allen, Douglas Yuill, Vasquez Barquero, Scott and 
Storper maintain this theory), this perspective emphasizes a 'market' point of view, which 
focuses on the promotion of the dynamics of productivity and innovation as the main 
instrument for the internationalisation of enterprises in marginal areas. 
However, this approach implies the identification of endogenous enterprises that can 
accomplish the function of 'bridge' towards the internationalisation through their past 
experience and disposition for innovation; these could also trigger the development of small 
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and medium sized enterprises which could 'adopt' their experience and market presence 
strategies. 
The supporting policy should be rather selective, it should privilege the rationalisation of 
business organisation and the introduction of innovation processes. But this policy should 
intervene in the very first phase only, in order to free enterprises from cultural, organizational 
and technological 'bonds', then rapidly exhaust its supporting effects and allow enterprises to 
work in full autonomy on the market. 
If the direction of economic rebalance or convergence on the European scale is valid, 
intervention policy should be addressed towards the accessibility of those organisational, 
social and political factors that peripheral regions still lack. This applies especially to Italian 
regions of Objective 1, which in recent years have accomplished interesting results in terms of 
modernization of the bureaucratic machinery and openness towards the internationalisation of 
local productive systems. As a matter of fact, a good incentive policy has favoured the 
concentration of resources in technologically advanced sectors (ICT) with considerable 
results, which should be backed by an adequate promotion of their territorial diffusion. 
At the same time, it is necessary to implement a policy that supplies infrastructure 
resources for metropolitan networks, as services and infrastructures themselves have their 
main organisational core right in the urban environment. 
 
PROBLEMS INSTRUMENTS GOALS 
Geographic 
marginality 
Acceleration of investments in 
intermodal infrastructures 
Reducing the disadvantages 
caused by geographic 
configuration through an 
efficient network of 
integrated transportations 
that exploits port facilities 
potentiality 
Weakening of 
convergence policies 
that favour Southern 
regions 
Consideration of disadvantage 
parameters – differentiation of 
regional policies co-financed 
according dynamic levels of 
convergence 
Allowing the completion of 
convergence processes and 
the coordination between 
national and community 
regional policies 
Competitiveness in 
productive localisation 
Fiscal policy that favour foreign 
investments – organizational 
innovation and administrative 
simplification 
Development of good 
administrative conducts. 
Rationalisation of school and 
education orientation. 
Planning of settling 
convenience 
Technological gap and 
competitiveness of 
productive system and 
labour market 
Development of research and 
transfer of innovative technologies. 
Promotion of technical and 
scientific cooperation. Surfacing of 
informal work. Introduction of 
further instrument of flexibility 
Introducing instruments of 
organisational efficiency. 
Increasing productivity. 
Technological advance and 
diffusion of systemic 
interaction processes. 
Concentration of 
development in the 
extended Lotharingian 
corridor 
Strengthening of Euro-
Mediterranean policy and 
widening of cooperation 
agreements for development 
assistance 
Favouring the development 
of a positive North-South 
interface that aims at the 
inter-Mediterranean 
cooperation. 
Life quality and urban 
and territorial safety 
Crime prevention – Territory 
control. Policies of urban and 
territorial promotion. Policies of 
cultural promotion 
Making the settlement 
supply competitive through 
interventions of urban and 
territorial marketing and of 
individual and collective 
security 
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In short, the model of economic convergence that will be targeted will prevent that the 
enlargement to the East provoke further disadvantages for the less developed regions. Such 
model will have to result from a careful reading of the 'issues' that prevent the diffusion of the 
conditions for a balanced growth in order to isolate the necessary 'instruments' for the support 
of a virtuous process; also, the goals will have to be oriented towards the achievement of an 
efficacious political project of regional development, in relation to the plan of European 
integration. 
The scheme has been formulated on the basis of the most recent literature; it outlines a 
number of mechanisms that would eliminate the conditions of underdevelopment of some 
marginal areas working on fundamental issues, which could prevent the implementation of 
valid instruments for regional economic development. 
In conclusion, despite the future enlargement, the geopolitical scenario is dominated by the 
weakness of the Southern front. A smaller enlargement (Malta and Cyprus) cannot have a 
considerable effect, unless this is followed by a hypothetical entry of Turkey and more stable 
relationship with the Maghreb-Mashreck area. Such a goal has a significant strategic role as it 
allows the achievement of a real inter-regional cooperation bridge that is oriented toward the 
Middle-Eastern area. This area is extremely important and it seems essential that the EU 
increase its weight on such a complex political scenario. 
In the meanwhile, the integration process that targets the European East has an enormous 
symbolic value, of a purely political nature, in spite of some economic concerns caused by the 
need of dividing scarce resources among a greater number of partners and less developed 
regional environment. As a matter of fact, such policy has a crucial role due to the difficulties 
in terms of economic convergence and due to the sacrifices that many EU countries will have 
to face because of the extension of the more disadvantaged area. 
After all, the motivations of geopolitics, which have been regularly sacrificed on the alter 
of geoeconomic convenience, are definitively strong: the binding force that Europe is looking 
for, the real cohesion that can cement the population from Thames to Seine, from Rhone to 
Danube, from the North Sea to the Mediterranean Sea, is nothing but that single common ideal 
that unites our origins and our cultural experience, giving the ideal dignity and the political 
unity to this larger European Union that is facing the 21st century.  
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